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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WESTERN ~IACHINERY COMPANY
A Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.

9611

H. K. RIDDLE and E. J. MAYHEW,
Defendant-Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.

RESPONDEN'TS and CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

8TATE11:ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action on an agreement for the transfer
of personal property arising out of the failure of Defendants to complete payment under the agreement and the
subsequent repossession and resale by Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court, sitting without a jury, found that
the agreement was a rental contract, and allowed Plaintiff the rentals it claimed, plus cost of repairs and the
cost of repossession, less the proceeds of the resale of
the property.
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RELIEF SOlJGHT ON APPEAL
Cross-Appellant and Defendant E. J. 1fayhew seeks
reversal of the Judgment of the Lower Court and the
entry of a decree dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 29, 1960, Defendants E. J. 1fayhew and H. K. Riddle signed the Plaintiff's form of
"RENT'AL AGREE1lENT'' as n1odified. (Exhibit ''1,''
Record Page 2). It stated that the Plaintiff leased to
the Defendants a specifically described piece of machinery. Typed immediately below the description appears
the following clause:
"Upon receipt of final payment, Western
Machinery Company agrees to execute a 'Bill of
Sale' to transfer Title of this T'ractor Shovel to
H. K. Riddle and E. J. 1\tfayhew."
The front of the document further provides that
Defendants agree to pay as "rentaF' the smn of $511.00
per month.
Deleted frmn the printed fonn is the following
clause:
"Said rent is to begin on the day the said
property is delivered to Lessee, and is to end
on the day said property is returned by said
Lessee to Lessor, at ------------------------------···-··---·····-····"
The contract then provides :
"Said property is hereby leased for a term
of 24 Months l\1:inimum Guaranteed."
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The balance of the paragraph in the printed for:m,
which was deleted, read :
''and if Lessee retains said property after the
expiration of said term, such retention shall be
construed as a continuance of this Lease, at the
same rental, and under the same terms, until said
property is so returned to Lessor, at the place
above specified. At any time after the expirations
[sic] of said original term, upon T·HREE (3)
days written notice to be given by Lessor to
Lessee, Lessee agrees to return said property to
Lessor, at said place."
On the reverse side of the printed form appear
certain general conditions; the last printed provisiOn
thereon, which was deleted, read as follows :
"Lessee further agrees to use said property
for only one shift of eight (8) hours per day of
twenty-four (24) hours. If Lessee desires to use
said property for more than eight (8) hours in fu""'lY
one twenty-four (24) hour day then such additional time is to be paid for by Lessee on a prorata basis at the sa1ne rate as herein provided."
The mac:hine \Yas delivered to Defendant H. K. Riddle
and maintained on property owned by him until Plaintiff
repossessed it. The value of the machine at the time the
agreement was entered into was $10,950.00. The cost
of repossessing the machine was $217.84, and the cost
of repairs made prior to resale by Plaintiff after repossession was $804.68. The Defendant H. K. Riddle paid
$1,000.00 to apply on the agreement on March 2, 1960;
there were no payments applied on the contract thereafter.
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Plaintiff repossessed the machine in April, 1961, and
sold it in "June or July" of 1961 for $6,400.00. (Record
page 32). No portion of the proce·eds of sale was credited
to Defendants' account. (Record, page 32). Plaintiff
claimed unpaid "rentals'' for the ''lease" of the machine
of $7,176.00.
The Lower Court concluded that the agreement was
a rental agreement, allowed the rentals of $7,176.00 plus
transportation charges of $217.84, and cost of repairs
of $804.68, and reduced the sum thereof by the proceeds
of the sale, $6,400.00, and gave Plaintiff judgment for
$1,798.52 and attorney's fees in the sum of $500.00.
ARGUMEN·T
POINT I.
ALL OF THE DEFENSES RAISED WERE WITHIN
THE T'ERMS OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER, AS AMENDED,
AND APPELLANT WAS FULLY APPRISED OF SAID DEFENSES.

Plaintiff seems to contend that Defendant was not
entitled to claim or show that the rental agreement was
anything other than that (Plaintiff's Brief Page 3). However, the defenses raised both at the time of trial and here
were set forth in the Pre-Trial Order, as a1nended, (Record, Pages 9-13). The Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that the Pre-Trial Order
"recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered, and which limits the issues
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for trial to those not disposed of by admissions
or agreements of counsel; and such order when
entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless Inodified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice .... " (Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure)
POINT II.
THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED AND THEREFORE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, MADE AT
THE OUTSET OF THE TRIAL AND AT THE CONCLUSION
OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The agreement attached to Plaintiff's C01nplaint and
introduced as Exhibit 1 in the case shows on its face that
it is a Conditional Sales Contract as a matter of law.
(See Point III, infra).
Since Plaintiff and Appellant never altered its
theory of the case, to-wit, that the contract was a rental
agreement, both its Complaint and its case in chief had
to stand or fall on that theory.
Consequently, Defendant's

~:fotion

to Dismiss made

at the outset of the trial (Record, Page 18) should have
been granted. Also the

~lotion

to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Complaint made at the close of Plaintiff's case (Record,
Pages 27-28) should have been granted. Both of these
motions were expressly reserved and the Lower Court
expressly saved Defendant his rights by virtue of said
motions (Record, Page 28, Lines 21 to 23).
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POINT III.
THAT 'THE AGREEMENT AS DRAWN IS NOT A RENTAL OR LEASE AGREEMENT BUT IS A CONDITIONAL
SALES CONTRACT.

It has already been called to the Court's attention
that the form agreement has been 1nodified as set forth
in the Statement of Facts. You will note that the contract
contains an express provision that upon receipt of the
24-month guaranteed payments the Plaintiff will transfer
title to the Defendants. There is no requirement that
the Defendants exercise any option or take any steps or
do anything further to acquire title after 1naking payment
for the 24-month period. !1ost of the significant portions
of the form agreement which would indicate a lease 'have
been deleted.
A general statement of the law applicable to this
situation is contained in 47 Am. Jur. 23, Sales, Section
836 whieh reads as follows :
" . . . A conditional sale contemplates the
passing of title at some time to the vendee and
the payment of the purchase price; a bailment contemplates that title shall not pass and that the
property shall be returned to the bailor or disposed of as he directs. (See 6 Am. J ur. 162, Bailments, Section 35.) Of the cases wherein the
courts have had to determine the character of
agreements as being either conditional sales or
bailments, a large majority possess the following
ciharacteristics : The parties are styled 'bailor'
and 'bailee,' or 'le,ssor' and 'lessee;' the contract
states that the one party delivers to the other
on hire the property forn1ing the subject matter
of the contract; and it is provided that the re-
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ceiver of the property shall make certain payments, termed 'rentals,' amounting in all to the
full value of the property, that the legal title or
right of property shall remain in the person delivering the property, and that when all of the
payments have been made the receiver of the
property shall become the owner thereof. Contracts of this character have been held in a majority of jurisdictions to constitute conditional sales
or absolute sales with mortgage back to secure the
price, and not hailments or leases. (Citing many
cases and Anno : 17 ALR 1466, s. 43 ALR 1262 and
92 ALR 335; 9 LRA 373 ; 12 LRA 446; 7 Am. St.
Rep. 262; 35 Am. St. Rep. 495; 46 Am. St. Rep.
296 ; 94 Am. St. Rep. 249 ; 12 Ann. Cas. 87 6 . . .)
''The test most frequently applied is whether
the so-called 'lessee' is obligated to accept and
pay for the property at smne future time, or, on
the other hand, whether his primary obligation is
to return or account for the property to the socalled 'lessor' according to the terms of the 'le.ase.'
In the latter case, according to the weight of
authority, the transaction is a bailment. (See
6 Am. Jur. 167, Bailments, Section 38.)"
The above comments are confirmed and amplified
in 17 ALB 1421 at 1466, 43 ALB 1247 at 125G, 92: ALR!
304 at 323 and 175 ALR 1366 at 1397.
In 17 ALR 1421 at page 1466 there appears a whole
line of cases supporting Defendant's position that a contract of the kind at issue here is a conditional sales contract, which cases are prefaced by the remarks:
"As heretofore remarked many contracts containing a reservation of title provision are in the
form of a lease, or contain language more apt for
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a lease or a hire than for a conditional sale. In
construing such contracts, the test generally applied to determine the character is as to ~hether
a return of the property is within the nghts of
the transferrer [sic] ; if he is required or is entitled to return the property, in lieu of paying
the purchase price, the contract will be construed
to be a lease, but if he is obligated to pay the
purchase price, even though it is referred to as
rental, the contract will be construed to be a salegenerally a conditional sale."
In 43 ALR 1247 at 1258 it is reported:
''That the contract is one of conditional sale
and not of lease, is more evident where no conditional payment is required, as where the lessor
agrees to execute and deliver a bill of sale for
the property upon the completion of the payments
specified in the contract. Vorenberg v. Americwa
House Hotel Company (1923) 246 Mass. 108, 140
NE 297.''
Again at 92 ALR 304 at 323 the following is reported:
"A so-called contract of lease by which the
lessee binds himself at once and ir:r:evocably for
a rental equal to the full value of the thing leased,
and is to become owner thereof when the so-called
rental is all paid in full, and without the payment
of any further consideration, is nothing else than
a conditional sale disguised under the fonn of the
lease; but the contract by which a party binds
hlinself to pay in instalhnents a certain sum for
the use of a thing, with the privilege of becoming
the owner thereof upon paying a further su1n, for
which, however, he has not bound himself absolutely is simply a lease with an option to pure~1ase ..
and is not a contract of sale. Byrd v. Cooper
(1928) 166 La. 402, 117 So. 441."
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Again in 175 ALR 1366 at 1397 it is reported:
"Although the contract may refer to the payments to be made as rent, if it also provides that
title shall pass when such rent is paid in full, it is
a conditional contract of sale. Billiter v. Ledbetter-Johnson Contractors (1939) 60 Ga. App.
1, 2 S.E. 2d 677."
In this case we have a delivery of the property to
the Defendants, an unconditional promise to pay 24
monthly payments of $511.00 each, under an agreement
that when those payments are made the Plaintiff will
transfer title to the Defendants without any further payment by Defendants or without an exercise of any option
by Defendants, or indeed without any further act by
Defendants. There is no right of the buyers to return
the property and in fact the portion of the form contract which would give the plaintiff the right to terminate
the lease and take back the property has been deleted by
the parties. There is no question but what this is a conditional sales contract as a matter of law and not a rental
or lease agreement.
POINT IV.
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVING REPOSSESSED
AND SOLD THE PROPERTY WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT
OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT, IT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO ANY FURTHER RECOVERY.

The agreement which is the subject of this action is
a conditional sales contract. It contains no provision
that Western Machinery Company was entitled to hold
the Defendants liable for any deficiency in the event of
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repossession and resale. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff repossessed the machinery which is the subject of the
contract. Thereafter it retained the property for "several months." (Record, page 32, line 14). Therefore,
Plaintiff is precluded from any further recovery from
Defendants at this point.
It is the great weight of authority that where a
conditional sales contract contains no provision for repossession, resale and assessment of any deficiency
against the buyer, the seller, by repossessing, elects his
remedy and is precluded from suing buyer for the purchase price or any part thereof. 37 ALR 91, 83 ALR 959,
99 ALR 1288, and 49 ALR 2d 15 at 66. These annotations
contain cases too numerous to cite individually, but they
clearly support the proposition just stated.
The same general proposition is supported in the
case of IXL Stores Company v. Moon (1916) 49 Utah
262, 162 P. 622. In that case the court asks the question,
''vVhat are the legal rights of a vendor of personal property as against the vendee in case the vendor retains the
title to the property until the purchase price is fully paid
and in case of default of paYJ.nent of the purchase price,
or any part thereof, the vendor repossesses himself of
the property which is the subject of sale, either with
or without the consent of the vendee f" In answer the
Court cites authorit:\~ stating that the vendor has a choice
of remedies. I-Ie can treat the contract as rescinded and
recover his goods, in which case he foregoes anY other
ren1edy. l-Ie may treat the contract as breached and sue
for his damages. He may waive return of the goods and
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sue for the purchase price, or he may sue for specific performance holding the goods as security therefor. The
Court held that the vendor had rescinded the contract
because he had repossessed the properties and treated
them as his own.
N ot.e that in the case at bar the vendor has done the
very same thing. It has repossessed the equipment,
caused rBpairs to be made thereon and has waited "several 1nonths" to sell the machinery. It certainly treated
the n1achine as its own; it did not even bother to account
to the Defendants for the sale price when it was sold.
The case of Franz v. Hair) (1930) 76 Utah 281, 289
P. 130, 83 ALR 990 cites the IXL case as good law. Down
to the present day courts have held this to be good law.
See Gauntt v. I vie) 29 Ill. App. 2d 186, 172 NE 2d 366;
Webb v. Litz (Ala. App.) 902 So. 2d 915.
Of particular interest in this connection is the case
of International Harvester Co v. Bauer (1917) 82 Ore.
686, 162 P. 856, (as reported in 37 ALR 91 at 93) in which
it was held that where a contract of conditional sale was
in the form of a lease, with a provision that, in the event
of the default of the Buyer, the Seller may resume possession of the property and apply the amount paid as
earned rentals, the retaking of the property by the Seller
amounts to a rescission of the contract which relieves the
Buyer from further obligation for the balance due on
the purchase price.
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POINT V.
'THAT IF THE PLAINTIFF WERE ENTITLED TO REPOSSESS AND SELL THE PROPERTY WHICH W A8 THE
SUBJECT OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND
HOLD THE DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR ANY DEFICIENCY,
IT DID NOT DILIGENTLY PROCEED TO REPOSSESS AND
SELL THE MACHINERY OR TO GET THE BEST PRICE
OBTAINABLE THEREFOR, AND SO IS ENTITLED TO NO
RECOVERY.

The Plaintiff herein did not take any steps to limit
or mitigate its damage after the default. Although the
contract was in default very early in the life of the agreement, Plaintiff did not repossess the property for a period of thirt~en months, and then did not resell the property
for a considerable time after repossession.
It is uniformly held that a seller under conditional
sales contracts must proceed with diligence to protect
hls interest if he intends to hold the defaulting pur0haser
for any deficiency. K·nudsen 111usic Co. v. Masterson
(1952) 121 Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973. See also 49 ALR 2d
15 at Pages 25 and 66. The cases cited therein as well
as the Knudsen case hold that if the seller is entitled to
recover any deficiency against the buyer for the difference between the unpaid contract price and the proceeds
of the resale after repossession, the seller must proceed
diligently. Since this "~as not· done here, the Plaintiff
is harDed from any recovery.
POINT VI.
THAT ASSUMING THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION
IS IN FACT A RENTAL AGREEMENT, THE PLAINTIFF
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OWED DEFENDANT AN OBLIG.A:TION TO MITIGATE THE
DAMAGE, WHICH IT DID NOT DO, AND IS THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO NO RECOVERY.

Defendant and Cross-Appellant contends that the
contract in question must he found to he a conditional
sales contract as a matter of law. In the event, however,
the Court should hold that the contract is a rental agreement, then Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if its
claims were allowed.
Plaintiff is suing for rental payments for seventeen
months in the total sum of $7,176..00. In addition, the
Plaintiff has received payments of $1,000.00 on the contract. On top of that, it has repossessed the machinery
which is the subject matter of the contract and has sold
the same for $6,400.00. If judgment is granted as prayed,
the Plaintiff would receive a total of $14,576.00 from
the transaction, plus all of its costs and attorneys' fees.
The retail price of the machinery is $10,950.00. If
judgment were granted as prayed, the Plaintiff would
make a profit on the transaction equal to $3,626.00. It
would n1ake a profit of $2,312.00 over and above its
original contract price, which already contemplated a
profit.
It surely cannot seriously be contended that any
rental agreement would justify this result. It was expressly agreed between the parties by the terms of the
written contract that upon the payment of the total
sum of $12,264.00, Plaintiff would transfer title to the
equipment to Defendants. Are they entitled to make an
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additional $2,312.00 clear in the event of default~
There is no question but what Plaintiff owed a duty
to Defendant upon repossession to mitigate its damages.
It should at least apply the proce·eds of the resale to the
credit of Defendants' account, or in the alternative, have
re-leased the property to another lessee and credited the
proceeds of said rental to Defendants' account. Not having done this, Plaintiff must he precluded from recoV'ery.
SUMMARY
Based upon the foregoing points it is contended that
Plaintiff is precluded from any recovery because the
contract is a conditional sales contract and because Plaintiff repossessed the equipment and thus rescinded the
contract; that in any event, Plaintiff did not proceed with
diligence to secure its right against the equipment and
that it is precluded from recovering on that basis also.
In the event the court concludes the contract is a
rental agreement, then it is respectfully submitted that
Plaintiff is still barred from recovery. Any other holding
would be unconscionable and would give undue profit to
the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & MOYLE
By HARDIN A. WHITNEY, JR.
Attorneys fo·r Respondent and
Cross-Appellant E. J. Ma.yhew
810 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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